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Towards an Observational Economics of Business Behaviour: The Horizontal Supply Curve 
'Fuzzy' Demand and Other Anomalies for Conventional Theory 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to advocate the development of an empirically-based approach to the 
study of business behaviour which I have termed ‘observational economics’. The distinguishing 
feature of this branch of economics would be an insistence that its domain be restricted to what is 
observable in the real world. In place of the axioms of neoclassical economics the focus would be 
on observed phenomena. 
In this introductory section it is contended that adoption of an observational perspective offers 
the prospect of fruitful interaction between economists and the business community, an interaction 2 
 
which was a feature of political economy until the present century. It is emphasised that progress 
in the reestablishment of the observational tradition is dependent on recognition and observance of 
a separate but complementary relationship with mainstream theory. 
The  second  section  emphasises  this  by  considering  a  number  of  phenomena  which  have 
hitherto been largely ignored or neglected because of their anomalous status from the viewpoint of 
conventional microeconomics, but which are demonstrated to be fundamental to an observational 
perspective on price and output determination. A very basic observational model of price and 
output determination is sketched in the final section. 
 
1.1.  The Need for an Observational Economics  
The  discipline  of  economics,  despite  its  venerable  status,  appears  to  contribute  little  to 
contemporary business decision making. By contrast, more recently developed intellectual areas 
such  as  management  science,  organisational  theory,  marketing  and  human  relations  have 
generated  a  substantial  literature  which  directly  impact  on  the  practice  of  business  and 
management. 
The  present  gulf  between  the  concerns  of  the  economist  and  the  world  of  business  is 
attributable in large measure to the development of increasingly more abstract and mathematically 
sophisticated economic models. In this respect Dennis Mueller remarks that  
we, the economics profession, are ill-equipped to answer ... important questions about 
what  corporations  are  and  do  because  we  have  come  to rely  too  much  on abstract 
simplification  of  what  corporate  actors  do  (or  ought  to  do).  To  understand  the 
corporation, and the important role it plays in the economy, we need to build our analysis 
on a richer behavioral foundation (Mueller: 1992: 147-48). 
He  aligns  himself  with  a  significant  number  of economists  who  he  asserts have,  directly  or 
indirectly, recommended abandoning both profits maximization, indeed maximization modeling 
of any kind, and market equilibria as assumptions in economic modeling because of their lack of 
realism'' (Mueller, 1992:164.) 
In arguing for an "economics without equilibrium", Nicholas Kaldor criticised economists who 
had developed, to a high degree of sophistication, the logical properties of economic equilibrium, 
but without investigating the correspondence of the theory's axioms with reality or whether the 
propositions derived from them deductively could be verified. He labelled the prevailing theory “a 
system  of  derived  tautologies.''  He  proposed  instead  the  development  of  theories  based  on 
observation and induction, focussing on the discovery of empirical regularities of associations that 
could yield refutable hypotheses. Along these lines he argued for the use of "stylized facts" as the 
basis for theory building, such "facts'' not being invariably true in all conceivable instances but true 
in the broad majority of cases. The objective should be to seek the most reasonable explanation 
capable of accounting for the facts (Kaldor, 1985:8-13). 
One of the foremost defenders of neoclassical economics, Fritz Machlup, in his American 
Economic Association Presidential Address, acknowledged that the firm in traditional price theory 
was a ''theoretical construct'' which had no direct, observable, concrete meaning. ''The model of the 
firm in that theory is not, as so many writers believe, designed to serve to explain and predict the 
behavior of real firms; instead, it is designed to explain and predict changes in observed prices ... 
as effects of particular changes in conditions" (Machlup, 1967:9). If we accept Machlup's position 3 
 
then there is an obvious need for an alternative approach which is expressly concerned "to explain 
and predict the behavior of real firms." 
The present study is an attempt to develop an observational economics of business behaviour in 
the real world. ''Observational'' is employed here in the sense in which it pertains to science, where 
''observation'' denotes ''accurate watching and noting of phenomena as they occur in nature with 
regard to cause and effect or mutual relations'' (Concise Oxford Dictionary). The observational 
approach  would  impose  simple  but  logical  restrictions  on  economic  researchers.  All  of  the 
elements which are to be incorporated into their models must be founded on or consistent with 
observed behaviour. As a consequence, the decision making embodied in such models can only be 
based on information which would actually be available to the decision makers. 
Observational economics would offer a fresh perspective on theoretical and empirical work 
which has been forgotten or ignored. There is a mass of such material which has been neglected 
because of its inconsistency with and lack of relevance to axiomatic economics. Many of these 
empirical studies and observationally-based theories are worth re-examining for the insight they 
might bring to the world of practical business affairs. An observational agenda also provides 
encouragement for further research into actual corporate operations. In this respect it is interesting 
to note Robert Lanzillotti's statement almost forty years ago concerning his survey of the pricing 
objectives of large companies: 
The principal purpose of this paper has been to contribute to our knowledge of the actual 
process by which prices are formed in industry, with the expectation that the bias will 
help  in  constructing  a  more  realistic  theory  of  the  firm  capable  of  yielding  useful 
predictions of industrial price behaviour (Lanzillotti, 1958:938). 
I believe that it is important to emphasise that we have become a profession that has been 
trained not to observe. The economist's characteristic device, “let us assume'' serves to make 
observation redundant. 
 
1.2.  The Decline of an Observational Perspective in Economics 
The separation of economic theory from the real world of business is essentially a twentieth 
century phenomenon. Earlier economists such as Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall attempted to 
identify general principles underlying real world economic behaviour, particularly in relation to 
business and industry. Their writings indicate a detailed familiarity with the actual conditions 
under which businesses of their time operated. For instance, Mueller (1994) emphasises the focus 
on observation of business behaviour in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations: 
When ... I read the Wealth of Nations, I am struck most of all by Smith's powers of 
observation. Here was a man who could walk through a pin factory and deduce general 
principles about the organization of industry. Here was a man who could observe the 
simple commerce of the butcher and the baker and deduce the fundamental principle of 
market  organization.  All  of  the  propositions  that  Smith  put  forward  are  either  a 
combination of observation and deduction, or an observation by itself [emphasis in 
original]. 
He notes that the famous passage describing the tendency of trades people to discuss conspiracies 
against the public would appear to stem either from direct observation of the business community, 
or a combination of observation and introspection'' (Mueller, 1994:28). His position is that Smith's 4 
 
classic treatise is not a series of hypotheses about how individuals and markets will behave, but 
rather a treasure chest of observations of how they do behave'' (Mueller, 1992:149). 
Mueller  also  observes  that  "[e]conomics  remained  a  healthy  mixture  of  induction  and 
deduction'' until the neoclassical revolution of the late 19th century, when there was a struggle 
between those who favoured the previously dominant inductive/historical methodology and the 
neoclassicists  who  employed  abstract  models  and  deductive  reasoning.  Although  the  latter 
emerged  triumphant,  their  victory  was  not  immediate.  For  example,  although  Marshall  was 
undeniably a neoclassical economist, "his work is thoroughly grounded on his observations of how 
businesses and markets work.” 
Similarly Mueller points out that Keynes's invention of macroeconomics was his response to 
the observation that markets in the real world did not seem to perform as described in the models of 
neoclassical economics. He also remarks: "The passages in the General Theory that are most often 
quoted  ...  are  inevitably  Keynes's  insightful  observations  about  human  nature  and  economic 
institutions, rather than analytical deductions from his models” (Mueller, 1994:28-29). 
At least since the formation of the Oxford Economists' Research Group in the 'Thirties, some 
economists have recognised the inapplicability of conventional theory to practical problems and 
have endeavoured to develop more realistic models. Interestingly the members of the Oxford 
Group began their investigations as committed marginalists, but soon found that their detailed 
questioning of businessmen yielded answers which were clearly at odds with accepted theory. This 
disenchantment is clearly evidenced in the Hall and Hitch report on full cost pricing and it also 
certainly motivated Philip Andrews's long crusade to develop and have accepted his normal cost 
theory. These works subsequently influenced more modem scholars such as Paolo Sylos-Labini, 
Alfred Eichner and other Post Keynesian macroeconomists who can be seen to have a strongly 
observational orientation in their work. Similarly, in the United States, there have been attempts to 
develop theories of behavioral and managerial economics which, as the names suggest, propose 
the introduction of more realistic assumptions to the theory of the firm. 
The  reason  why  these  attempts  to  reform  the  accepted  theory  have  ultimately  been 
unsuccessful is, I believe, that their originators have all been unwilling or unable to completely 
abandon the neoclassical tradition. To a greater or lesser extent, they have tried to reconcile 
observed phenomena with the dominant theory, so that they end up with an incompatible mix of 
empirical and axiomatic elements. 
  In  the  event,  it  has  proved  virtually  impossible  to  incorporate  observational  elements 
undisturbed within a neoclassical framework. Inevitably the anomalous findings are either ignored 
or  reinterpreted  in  such  a  way  that  they  can  be  reconciled  with  the  dominant  paradigm. 
Neoclassical methodology has proven to be a vortex from which it is almost impossible to break 
away. 
For example, both behavioural and managerial models are essentially ''revisionist approaches" 
to the neoclassical theory of the firm. The distinguishing feature of the behavioural approach is its 
use of empirical analyses of decision processes of individual firms which are then incorporated 
into neoclassical models. By contrast, the managerial approach modifies the neoclassical objective 
function to incorporate the results of empirical observations of individual firm behaviour. An 
important characteristic of both approaches is that they cease to be a priori because the firm's 
behaviour can no longer be deduced from the assumptions that describe their environment (Cyert 
and Hedrick, 1972:399). However, what needs to be emphasised is that both approaches basically 5 
 
represent  revisions  or  modifications  of  neoclassical  theory  and  thus  retain  most  of  the     
unrealistic behavioural assumptions that underpin that theory. 
There are many potentially valuable contributions relating to the economics of the business 
enterprise which have been neglected and largely forgotten. The main cause of this has been the 
tendency to employ equilibrium analysis as a filter for new ideas. Those elements of any novel 
work which can be incorporated, even if only by distortion, within the dominant paradigm are 
absorbed. Anything which does not fit that framework is ignored and discarded. It is precisely 
those ideas which can not be interpreted within the structure of comparative statics which are 
likely to shed light on the behaviour of firms in the real world. What has happened is not so much 
''throwing out the baby with the bathwater'' as ''throwing out the baby instead of the bathwater.'' 
 
1.3.  Observational Economics as a Separate but Complementary Endeavour  
 
Machlup's stricture on the pretensions of behavioural economics as an alternative to marginalist 
theory has relevance to the appropriate role for an observational economics: 
 
A research programme designed to result in theories that explain and predict the actions 
of  particular  firms  can  never  compete  with  the  simplicity  and  generality  of  the 
marginality theory, which, being based on the constructs of a fictitious profit-maximizer, 
cannot have the ambition to explain the behaviour of actual firms in the real world' 
(Machlup, 1978:525). 
In considering the usefulness of value theory as a tool of analysis, Richard Ruggles contends 
that the concepts of the theory of the firm are not structured so as to be operable in empirical terms 
and thus cannot legitimately be used to analyse empirical situations. He also points out that, 
because the micro concepts used in value theory are basically different from the macro concepts of 
aggregative analysis, there is a wide gap between micro and macro theory. As a result aggregative 
theory cannot use micro behaviour theory to check the implicit propositions about producer and 
consumer behaviour inherent in the aggregate behaviour patterns posited or observed. 
He goes on to suggest that "a separate conceptual framework must be erected for classifying 
empirical information about the individual firm. Such a framework should be of a very general 
nature and take into account the requirements of macro theory as well as those of micro theory. 
The basic criterion for the classification scheme adopted should be "empirical operability'', with 
both functional and institutional characteristics being observed as much as possible. Finally, he 
suggests that such a framework should be used in conjunction with orthodox value theory rather 
than substituted for it'' (Ruggles, 1954:147-48). 
 I believe that it is important to acknowledge that an observational approach is unlikely to yield 
truly general theories. Therefore I would suggest that observational economics should set itself a 
modest agenda with limited objectives. In particular, it should present itself as a complementary 
endeavour to mainstream theorising rather than a competitor. 
On  the  other  hand,  because  it  implies  a  repudiation  of  axiomatic  reasoning  it  cannot  be 
legitimately graced onto conventional microeconomics and thus should always remain a separate 
activity, drawing where appropriate on the observationally valid findings of the senior section of 
the  discipline  and  perhaps,  in  turn,  yielding  empirical  insights  which  might  usefully  be 6 
 
incorporated into the more abstract models. 
Labels such as 'ad hoc' and ‘empiricist’ should not be regarded as pejorative when applied to 
observational economics but accepted as reflecting its proper status, for as Mueller observes 
"[a]lmost all models of complex behavior that try and account for observed patterns of data are ad 
hoc" (Mueller, 1992:166). However, I believe that there is a tendency to underestimate the degree 
of generality and regularity which will prove to be discernible in actual business behaviour. 
 
2. Some Aspects of Real World Price and Output Determination 
2.1. The Prevalence of Price Setting 
Price adjustment is the basic equilibrating mechanism in microeconomic theory, but as Tibor 
Scitovsky points out, “[t]rade at set prices is the most common form of market relation in our 
society'' (Scitovsky, 1952:21). Economists have usually ignored the evidence of price setting and 
the fact that once set, those prices are often intended to persist for a considerable period. In some 
instances price changes may occur frequently, as when the product or service is subject to the price 
competition of numerous other firms, but in many cases once set the price is intended to persist at 
least until some future review date such as the beginning of a new production season, unless 
extraordinary events have occurred in the interim. 
Sixty years ago, Arthur Burns reported that a diverse range of U.S. industries made use of price 
setting. This involved sellers quoting an offer price intended to remain open for an extended period 
of time, during which production would be adjusted to the amount demanded at that price. Among 
those employing the method were the oil, gasoline, bread, sugar, drugs, canning, agricultural 
implements, anthracite, tin plate, woollen fabric, carpet and automobile industries. The most 
extreme examples of price stability in Burns's time came from the steel industry. He cited the fact 
that soon after the formation of the United Steel Corporation in 1901, the price of steel rails was set 
at $28 a ton. This price was maintained for a full fifteen years. After a six year period in which 
price was altered twelve times, a new price of $43 was established which lasted for over 10 years 
(Burns, 1936:197-206). 
A year earlier than Burns's study, in a report to the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Gardiner 
Means had drawn attention to an increasing incidence of what he termed ‘administered prices’, 
which were defined as prices "set by administrative action and held constant for a period of time," 
as distinct from market prices which were "made in the market as the result of the interaction of 
buyers  and  sellers''  (Means,  1962:78).  Means's  claim  of  a  shift  from  market  determined  to 
administered prices generated a number of articles contesting the view that administered prices 
were  a new or novel phenomenon. Among the disputants was Rufus Tucker, who produced 
statistical evidence that "in this country ever since 1790 our price structure has included a large 
number of prices that remained unchanged for months or years at a time, side by side with prices 
that changed monthly, weekly, daily, or in recent years even hourly.'' He insisted: 
Ever since manufacturers first began to sell elsewhere than at the factory, and to employ 
travelling salesmen, and to contract with wholesalers and jobbers, it has been necessary 
for them to announce prices and to stick by their announcements, or if they diverted from 
them to do so secretly (Tucker, 1938:47, 53). 
Scitovsky has pointed out that in markets characterised by mass production and large scale 
organisation, the cost to the producer or merchant of bargaining exceeds the gain from it. In such a 7 
 
situation suppliers can increase their profit by refusing to bargain and setting price on a ''take it or 
leave it'' basis. Buyers can buy as much as they want to, but only on set terms over which they have 
no control. Scitovsky contended that price setting applies in industrialised countries in all markets 
in which the consumer buys. Consumers face prices set by retailers, and smaller retailers face the 
set prices of producers and wholesalers (Scitovsky, 1952:19-22). 
Peter Wiles has also highlighted the importance of fixed prices, particularly in relation to 
manufacturing and distribution. In determining price, the firm has to make a prediction as to the 
''general level of output", i.e., what is the expected demand at the price. The normal procedure then 
is to ''fix a price for the 'season' and await customers" with the season being imprecisely defined 
but no more than a year in duration. Both sellers and buyers prefer 'take it or leave it'. Bargaining or 
higgling is a nuisance, and a waste of time and energy. Sellers with a large number of products 
cannot be sufficiently expert to be continually reconsidering the price of each one. In any case, 
Wiles maintained that higgling is the privilege of the owner entrepreneur while most selling is 
carried out by employees, who must be told what to charge (Wiles, 1961:45-49). 
It should be emphasised that firms which set their price are not necessarily price makers. Some 
firms such as those operating as price leaders, may have discretion to determine the level of their 
price, but many other firms have little option other than to follow the price decided by others, 
although this does not mean that they will exactly match the price set by the dominant firms. But 
what needs to be emphasised is that each, whether price maker or follower, sets or fixes their price 
with the intention of maintaining it for an extended period of time. 
Calculation of the set price is typically achieved by the use of a cost-based rule of thumb, of 
which a number of variants have been reported by economists. The most well-known is the 
full-cost pricing method first described by Robert Hall and Charles Hitch (1939), who claimed that 
firms based their pricing on average direct costs (assumed constant over a wide range of output), 
plus average indirect or overhead cost, together with a margin for profit. 
A feature of most of the cost-based pricing models is that costs are divided into direct and 
indirect rather than the economists' classification of variable and fixed. On the basis of empirical 
evidence, unit direct costs are assumed to be constant over the range of normal capacity utilisation. 
Heflebower questions the path-breaking status accorded to the Hall and Hitch study and others 
which related price changes to cost changes, pointing out that such practices had been described in 
business school texts since at least the 1920s (Heflebower, 1955:361). In addition, General Motors 
had been employing a similar pricing technique since the 'Twenties. Its pricing objective was to 
achieve on average over time an after-tax return on capital of approximately 15 percent. Average 
unit costs were calculated on an assumed 'standard volume' equivalent to 80 percent of plant 
capacity, with a  profit  margin  being  added sufficient  to  yield the  target  rate of  return.  This 
'standard  price'  would  then  be  adjusted  to  take  account  of  actual  and  potential  competition, 
business conditions, and other factors (Scherer, 1980:185-86). 
Heflebower points out that most versions of the full-cost principle hold that the firm sets its 
price having regard only to total unit costs at some assumed output rate, with no attention being 
given  to  demand.  However  he  suggests  that  closer  examination  reveals  that  the  cost  rules 
employed themselves contain, or in application are modified for, demand influences. "[T]he gross 
margin used by the individual firm reflects not its own indirect costs but rather the margin it finds 
by experience to be desirable in light of costs and market conduct of its rivals'' (Heflebower, 
1955:363, 366). 8 
 
 
2.2. The Horizontal Supply Curve  
An obvious implication of price setting is that, subject to output constraints, the firm is prepared to 
supply whatever quantities buyers demand at the set price. Any intersection of demand with the 
price line would represent a point on the firm's supply curve, since it indicates an amount that the 
firm is willing to supply at that price. Thus, in effect, the firm has a horizontal supply curve at the 
level of the set price. 
To re-emphasise the point, at the set price the firm is willing to supply whatever quantity the 
market demands up to the limit determined by current output plus any inventories brought forward 
from the immediately previous period. Therefore, the price line is coincident with the firm's supply 
curve, on the same logic used to justify the horizontal demand curve in perfect competition. 
Economists who have attempted to analyse price setting behaviour have generally failed to 
recognise the price line as a supply curve, probably because it coincides with the average revenue 
curve. For example, in Philip Andrews's theory of manufacturing business the firm is assumed to 
be  "offering  its  product  for  sale  at  a  fixed  price  which  will  remain  unchanged  despite  the 
fluctuations  in  output,''  which  results  in  what  he  refers  to  an  "average-revenue-price  line'' 
(Andrews, 1949b:253-56). Wiles asserted that setting and sticking to a price creates ''an infmitely 
elastic sales curve'' [emphasis in original], insisting that this sales curve was by no means a 
demand curve in that ''it does not describe the effect of price changes on quantity bought, it merely 
describes the seller's intention not to alter his price whatever he sells'' (Wiles, 1961:47). By 
contrast,  Romney  Robinson  explicitly  identified  the  price  line  in  administered  or  "code 
established'' pricing as the firm's short period supply curve (Robinson, 1961:207, 219). 
Eichner contends that there is no empirical support, at least outside of agriculture and mining, 
for a positively sloped supply curve. He finds no evidence that industrial firms encounter higher 
unit costs with expanded output, with the result that constant or increasing returns appear to be the 
rule. "To the extent that the concept of a supply curve is at all applicable to the industrial sector, the 
curve would appear to be perfectly elastic, at least over the observable range, rather than being 
positively sloped'' (Eichner, 1983:211, 213) It is interesting to note that Eichner had not always 
clearly identified the price line as a supply curve. Seven yars earlier, he had depicted a revenue 
function'' which was "a line parallel to the horizontal axis at a height equal to the price ... . This 
gives the revenue curve the appearance of an infinitely elastic demand curve'' (Eichner, 1976:44). 
 
2.3. 'Fuzzy' Demand 
R.A. Gordon observes that "[t]he pictures of continuous, negatively inclined demand curves that 
the theorist draws are figments of the theorist's ... imagination - at least so far as imperfectly 
competitive, industrial markets are concerned." He suggests that the business man knows very 
little about the nature of the demand curve for his various products and, in particular, does not 
ordinarily know how his sales would vary at different selling prices. "His great concern, on the 
demand side, is with the probability of a constantly changing volume of sales at a given price'' 
(Gordon. 1948:277). 
Some  other  economists  have  highlighted  the  unpredictability  of  demand.  For  example, 
Heflebower noted that oligopolistic industries experience wide variability of short run demand 
"cyclically or even more unsystematically'' (Heflebower, 1961:86), while Zarnowitz reports that 9 
 
many products of manufacturing industries face extremely unstable, sporadic, or individualized 
customer demand'' (Zarnowitz, 1962:391). 
While a number of more recent studies have drawn attention to situations of uncertain or 
stochastic demand, such works typically simply note or assume the stochastic nature of demand 
which is then incorporated into a variant of a conventional economic model. The uncertainty of 
demand is not in itself considered deserving of extended comment. An exception is Dennis Carlton 
(1978; 1984), who observes that "firms often do not know how much of their product will be 
demanded each day." He attributes the randomness of demand to the fact that "the number of 
customers that frequent the firm will generally vary from day to day'' (Carlton, 1978:571). 
The basically axiomatic model which he has developed does take account of "three essential 
features  of  market  operation''  which  can  be  seen  as  observationally  based.  These  are  "price 
inflexibility, demand uncertainty, and timing considerations.'' He notes that one reason for price 
inflexibility is that changing prices frequently is time consuming and costly, but he regards as of 
more importance the fact that prices may have to be maintained for some time if their "signal" is to 
be received. Demand is uncertain over the period during which prices are inflexible, and "at the 
beginning of any market period after prices have been set, firms do not know for sure what their 
demand will be, although they do know what the random distribution of demand looks like." By 
timing  considerations  he  means  "the  need  to  have  produced  or  to  have  made  some  prior 
commitment  to  production  ...  before  the  unknown  customer  demand  is  observed''  (Carlton, 
1978:571; 1984:11). 
Because of the randomness of demand firms are not confident that they can sell all they desire 
at the going price and are concerned with overproducing and being left with unsold goods, thus 
incurring  extra  holding  costs.  They  are  also  concerned  with  underproducing  and  therefore 
maintain inventories to protect against the loss of potential sales. A key feature of his analysis is 
that "as an outcome of the market process ... occasionally some customers will be unable to 
purchase the good." In Carlton's model firms set price and decide on output at the beginning of the 
market period, then observe their random demand. An equilibrium is derived where, in general, 
supply will not equal demand. However his notion of equilibrium is somewhat unique as its two 
elements are price and the probability of obtaining the good (Carlton, 1984:11-15). 
Notwithstanding the work of Carlton and some others, the general position is that, while the 
most casual inspection of almost any business's operating data would confirm that their product 
demand is both uncertain and variable, most economists have ignored or failed to perceive the fact 
that there is a substantial degree of uncertainty as to the quantity demanded from a particular seller 
in any time period. The amounts demanded will almost always fluctuate from period to period, 
often in a quite unpredictable manner. Some of this fluctuation can be anticipated, e.g., when it is 
due to seasonal or cyclical factors, etc., but there is almost invariably  a residual element of 
uncertainty. In a word, the demand for a particular product is almost always perceived by its 
producer to be 'fuzzy'. 
An important reason for the fuzziness of demand is the firm's own continuing endeavour to 
shift outwards its demand by way of advertising, the activities of its sales representatives or other 
marketing  efforts.  The  firm  can  be  expected  to  continually  seek  to  expand  its  sales  to  take 
advantage of its unutilised capacity. The use of advertising and other selling activities is not only 
to expand demand but also to protect established demand which may be slipping either absolutely 
or in terms of market share - further testimony to the dynamic and fluctuating nature of demand. 10 
 
The level of demand expected at the time of setting price may be very different to what the firm 
comes to expect in the light of actual market conditions. But this only reinforces the central point 
that the firm has at best only a fuzzy idea of the actual amount that will be demanded from it in any 
period. 
As a consequence of demand variability and unpredictability, we observe that real world 
markets typically do not clear. In any time period the quantity demanded will not equal the 
quantity supplied in the sense in which that term is usually used. What economists normally mean 
when they talk about quantity supplied is that quantity which is both produced and offered for sale 
in the current period. If demand is uncertain there is no reason to suppose that what is produced 
will exactly match what is demanded. 
 
2.4. The Role of lnventories and Order Backlogs 
Wilford Eiteman (1949) was one of the first economists to draw attention to the role of inventories 
in situations of uncertain and varying demand. In his model price is determined on the basis of a 
mark-up on costs calculated for that level of output representing ''the minimum reasonable use of 
the plant available.'' With price fixed, output is increased until inventories begin to rise at abnormal 
rates, then adjusted until they become stable. 
A more sophisticated analysis is that of F.M. Scherer who observes that because demand 
functions are constantly shifting, mistakes in setting output levels are inevitable. If too much is 
produced relative to the current flow of orders, the first reaction is a buildup of inventories or a 
reduction of order backlogs, while if too little is produced, inventories will be drawn down or 
delivery times extended. Inventories and order backlogs serve both as buffers for production 
imbalances and as feedback signals to guide the coordination of future production with demand. 
He finds it hard to understand why this system, which he judges to be "supremely operational'', has 
been overlooked so often by students of inventory behaviour. 
Inventory and order backlog movements provide the first level of response to demand shifts 
because  of  natural  lags  in  the  production  process.  Not  only  does  it  take  time  to  reschedule 
production but it is also costly. Setup, hiring and retraining costs increase with frequent production 
rate changes and there may be adverse effects on productivity and workforce morale. Further, 
given that “the flow of orders is inherently erratic,'” firms do not react to faint demand change 
signals  but  wait  to  confirm  a  more  persistent  demand  change  before  adjusting  the  level  of 
production (Scherer, 1980:193-94). 
As suggested by Scherer, the lack of coincidence in the real world between demand and supply 
means that firms either maintain inventories of their final products or have order backlogs for those 
products. If goods can be stored, then any imbalance is accommodated principally by changes in 
inventory levels. Because there are significant costs involved with frequent changes of price we 
can envisage a hierarchy of responses to mismatching of supply and demand. Initially, if output 
exceeds demand, the firm will simply allow inventories to rise, waiting to see if the imbalance 
persists or worsens. If it does, then the next step is to reduce output. The third level of response 
would involve a reduction in price, but this would never be undertaken without taking into account 
the anticipated responses of rival firms. In fact there is substantial evidence of firms' extreme 
reluctance  to  change  price to  accommodate  demand shifts.  A  similar  hierarchy  of  inventory 
depletion, increased output and the possibility of increased price would apply when demand 11 
 
continues to exceed supply. 
Firms in industries such as job printing and heavy engineering and most construction firms of 
necessity produce-to-order. In such situations, imbalances between supply and demand may lead 
to the accumulation of back orders. Backlogs of orders can be viewed as negative inventories and 
lend themselves to a mirror-image hierarchy of firm responses. 
Finally there are goods such as daily newspapers and breakfast croissants which are inherently 
non-storable. Here a certain quantity is produced in each period, based on an estimate of likely 
demand. If demand is in excess of output, it will remain unsatisfied or be diverted to another 
supplier or another product. If output exceeds demand, the unsold stock will have to be discarded. 
It is a matter of commercial judgement by the producer whether to aim for a degree of excess 
demand with the inevitable loss of sales revenue and the risk of loss of customer goodwill, or to err 
on the side of over-supply. which is likely to be preferred where the ratio of price to direct cost is 
relatively high. With these products we often observe out-of-stock situations or piles of unsold 
goods at the end of the day, providing obvious confirmation of suppliers' inability to forecast 
demand. 
 
3. A Rudimentary Model of Price and Output Determination 
Figure 1 depicts a very basic model of price and output determination by a manufacturing firm 
which  takes  account  of  the  phenomena  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  The  curve  ADC 
represents average direct cost which consists of raw materials and labour directly attributable to 
production of the particular good. ATC, or average total cost, is derived by superimposing average 
indirect or overhead cost on direct costs. The demand curve D is shown as disconnected and thick 
and grey to reflect its uncertain and fluctuating nature at the present level of price and the firm's 
lack of knowledge of its location at other prices. 
At the beginning of the pricing period the firm will set its price on the basis of a markup on 
estimated  unit  direct  costs  at  some  assumed  normal  level  of  output,  which  will  usually  be 
somewhat less than the sustainable capacity indicated in Figure 1. The dominant group of firms 
within the industry usually have some degree of discretion as to the amount of the markup. Often 
one firm will fill the role of price leader and try to set price so as to cover indirect cost together 
with a satisfactory level of profit. However, the markup will usually take into account margins 
conventionally applying in the industry, the state of competition, and the danger of attracting entry 
both from new and established firms. In particular the markup may have to be modified in the light 
of prices already announced by other strong competitors. 
Firms not in a position to determine their own price will probably follow those set by the price 
making firms. They will not necessarily exactly match such prices if, for instance, there are quality 
differentials  or  differing  degrees  of  consumer  acceptance  between  producers,  but  fringe  or 
subordinate firms will almost certainly set their price so that it has a close correspondence with that 
chosen by members of the dominant group. 
At the prevailing price the firm will be prepared to sell any quantity up the limit of its present 
output together with any inventories brought forward from the previous sales period. Thus the 
horizontal supply curve S is drawn so as to indicate that, due to the existence of inventories, for 
short periods supply can exceed sustainable output. 
Once price is set it will normally be maintained by the various firms throughout the pricing  
period. Gordon argues that "the business man will assume that his sales estimates will be wrong to 
some extent, but he is almost certain to be prepared, within a considerable margin of error on both 
sides of his sales estimate, to maintain his price during the period for which plans are being made." 
Gordon insists that price will only be altered as a result of 
envisaged as probable at the time the estimates were made. Eve
changed, strong efforts will be made to respond to the new situation through varying output, 
selling expense, product specifications, production techniques, and the like. "In any event, no 
change in price is likely to be made unless the business man is confident that the new situation will 
prevail for some considerable period'' (Gordon, 1948:283).
Figure 1. A basic model of the price setting manufacturing firm.
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Figure 1. A basic model of the price setting manufacturing firm. 
Labini points out that changes in the price of variable factors usually affect firms of all 
sizes and therefore have a very rapid effect on costs and eventually result in a change in price. A 
rise in the price of variable factors raises the costs of all firms, although not necessarily by the 
n. In such a situation the price leaders can raise the price of their products without 
fearing the reaction of rivals or the entry of new firms. But he is insistent that in general the   
prices of  goods produced under oligopolistic conditions are completely  rigid with respect to 
demand  variations.  Changes  in  quantity  demanded  cause  immediate  adjustments  in  supply. 
n order to administer prices" (Sylos-Labini, 1969:66
position is that price is unaffected by a shift of the demand curve, which involves a 
movement along the supply curve. A change in price is produced only by a change in costs which 
causes a shift of the supply curve itself (Eichner, 1983:222). 
stions by some authors, however, that the observed rigidity of price with 
respect to demand changes may be subject to some qualification. For instance, Heflebower notes 
that both general observation and the literature of the rigid-price controversy of the 1930s indicate 
responsive to demand shifts unless the demand change is sizeable and 
But he argues that this is less true of actual transaction prices. Demand va
ith price concessions, reclassification of customers and a
charges and services rendered. He found "few exceptions to the rule that transactions prices vary to 
some  degree  relative  to  quoted  prices  when  the  latter  do  not  move in  response  to 
Okun also suggests that there may be some demand-induced price changes which are masked 
induced. He points out that in many industries, when firms raise their prices they routinely 
issue announcements to their customers that higher costs have compelled the increase. He makes 
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the obvious point that no firm has ever explained to customers that it had raised price "to capture a 
larger share of the surplus in the relation as a result of a stronger market.'' Cost-based price 




This paper has focussed on aspects of business behaviour and its environment which are observed 
to be prevalent but which have been virtually ignored by neoclassical economists. These include 
the practice of setting price and maintaining it for extended periods, the unpredictability and 
variability of demand, and the maintenance of inventories and order backlogs. Each of these is 
difficult to account for within traditional theories but are seen to be readily incorporable within an 
observational framework. 
The model presented represents a modest initial step but provides a framework for further 
development and empirical testing and investigation. Much work needs to be done in extending the 
analysis, including consideration of such questions as the stability of the behavioural relationships 
outlined, the effect of entry, and pricing practices such as price leadership and limit pricing. There 
is also the need to appraise the observational validity of the equilibrium concept and optimisation 
assumptions in relation to the firm in the real world. 
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